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Abstract:  The paper examines the ways in which recent economic growth has been uneven in 
China and India and what this has meant for inequality and poverty. Drawing on analyses based 
on existing household survey data and aggregate data from official sources, the authors show that 
growth has indeed been uneven—geographically, sectorally and at the household level—and that 
this has meant uneven progress against poverty, less poverty reduction than might have been 
achieved had growth been more balanced, and an increase in income inequality. The paper then 
examines why growth was uneven and why this should be of concern. The discussion is 
structured around the idea that there are both “good” and “bad” inequalities—drivers and 
dimensions of inequality and uneven growth that are good or bad in terms of what they imply for 
both equity and long-term growth and development.  The authors argue that the development 
paths of both China and India have been influenced by, and have generated, both types of 
inequalities and that while good inequalities—most notably those that reflect the role of 
economic incentives—have been critical to the growth experience thus far, there is a risk that bad 
inequalities—those that prevent individuals from connecting to markets and limit investment and 
accumulation of human capital and physical capital—may undermine the sustainability of 
growth in the coming years. The authors argue that policies are needed that preserve the good 
inequalities—continued incentives for innovation and investment—but reduce the scope for bad 
ones, notably through investments in human capital and rural infrastructure that help the poor 
connect to markets. 
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The emergence of China and India on the global economic stage has understandably been 
the subject of much discussion in international media, business and policy circles. The nearly 9 
percent annual rate of real per-capita GDP growth that China has averaged over the last quarter 
century is unprecedented. And with an average growth rate of GDP per-capita of nearly 4 percent 
per annum since 1981, India’s “takeoff” seems less than spectacular only in comparison with 
China’s.  
In both China and India, this growth has been accompanied by substantial—in the case of 
China, dramatic—reductions in the aggregate incidence of absolute poverty measured in terms of 
income or consumption. Figure 1 displays the trends for the two countries over the period from 
1981 to 2001.
1 The headcount rates of poverty are calculated on as comparable a basis as is 
currently feasible with the data available. The poverty line is the World Bank’s dollar-a-day 
global standard of about $32.74 per month at 1993 Purchasing Power Parity. China started this 
period with the higher poverty rate, but this soon changed. 
 
































































































Source Poverty measures from Chen and Ravallion (2004). 
However, concerns are being expressed about the distributional impacts of the growth 
processes in both countries. The domestic debate about growth-promoting reforms has become 
increasingly contentious. It is widely felt that the gains from growth have been spread too 
unevenly, with some segments of the population left behind in relative and even absolute terms. 
Yes, the two giants are awakening from their slumber, but they are still only partially awake, as 
segments of their societies remain (relatively and absolutely) dormant.  This unevenness has 
shown up as rising income inequality by conventional measures in both countries. These 
developments in turn have led some to question the sustainability of growth. 
                                                 
1   At the time of writing, only preliminary data were available for India for 2004/05 and this data point is not 
plotted in Figure 1. The preliminary data suggest that the overall trend poverty rate in India indicated in Figure 1 has 
been maintained, although it has not accelerated (in percentage points per year) since the early 1990s.    3
What is one to make of this? In what ways has growth been uneven? Are the data 
suggesting rising inequality to be believed? If so, should the fact that segments of the population 
appear to have been left behind be of concern? And does this pose a risk to the sustainability of 
growth and poverty reduction? 
This paper tries to shed some light on these questions. While of undeniable interest in 
both countries, these questions also merit attention elsewhere because the impact that the rise of 
China and India is going to have on the rest of the world—a topic that has received enormous 
attention in the press over recent years—depends very much on whether these two giants are able 
to sustain the growth rates they have achieved over the last quarter century. And that in turn 
hinges on whether the concerns about the unevenness of the growth thus far are legitimate and 
whether that unevenness poses a risk to future growth. 
After noting a number of data issues, we examine the ways in which growth has been 
uneven in China and India and what that has meant for inequality and poverty. Drawing on 
analyses based on existing household survey data and aggregate data from official sources, we 
show that growth has indeed been uneven—geographically, sectorally and at the household-
level—and that this has meant uneven progress against poverty, less poverty reduction than 
might have been achieved had growth been more balanced, and an increase in income inequality. 
We then turn to why growth was uneven and why this should be of concern. Here, we draw on 
the evidence that is available. But because of the complexity of the underlying issues and the 
difficulties of settling them in an empirically rigorous manner, the discussion is necessarily 
somewhat more speculative. We structure the discussion around the idea that there are both 
“good” and “bad” inequalities—drivers and dimensions of inequality and uneven growth that are 
good or bad in terms of what they imply for both equity and long-term growth and development. 
We argue that the development paths of both India and China have been influenced by, 
and have generated, both types of inequalities and that while good inequalities—most notably 
those that reflect the role of economic incentives—have been critical to the growth experience 
thus far, there is a risk that bad inequalities—those that prevent individuals from connecting to 
markets and limit investment and accumulation of human capital and physical capital—may 
undermine the sustainability of growth in the coming years. We argue that policies are needed 
that preserve the good inequalities—continued incentives for innovation and investment—but 
reduce the scope for bad ones, notably through investments in human capital and rural 
infrastructure that help the poor connect to markets. 
1.  Data issues 
There are always reasons to be skeptical about economic statistics and measures of 
inequality and poverty are no exceptions. The issues are rather different in these two countries. 
A number of data problems have clouded past assessments of what has been happening to 
poverty and inequality in China. Some of these problems are common to other countries 
(developing and developed) while others are seemingly unique to China. Comparability between   4
urban and rural areas is a greater problem in China where the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) uses different survey instruments for urban and rural areas (whereas it is a unified survey 
instrument in India, as elsewhere). The two nationally representative annual surveys for China 
that we will draw on are the annual Rural Household Survey (RHS) and the annual Urban 
Household Survey (UHS). 
For the RHS there are also comparability problems over time, as discussed in Ravallion 
and Chen (2006). One of the more serious problems is that there was a change in valuation 
methods for consumption of own-farm production in the RHS in 1990 when public procurement 
prices (held below market prices) were replaced by local selling prices.
2 For 1990 (the only year 
for which the two methods can be compared), Ravallion and Chen (2006) show that the new 
valuation method generates slightly lower inequality; for 1990 the aggregate Gini index for rural 
China drops from 31.5 percent to 29.9 percent; the rural headcount index of poverty drops 
substantially, from 37.6 percent to 29.9 percent. This reflects the high share of consumption from 
own-farm product among China’s poor. 
Another problem in past work has been the failure to adjust for spatial cost-of-living 
differences. This can affect distributional comparisons over space and time. The extent of urban–
rural disparities drops appreciably once one corrects for the fact that the urban cost of living is 
higher (Ravallion and Chen, 2006). Also the positive trend in urban–rural inequality since 
around 1980 (noted by many authors in the literature) vanishes once one allows for the fact that 
the rate of inflation has been higher in urban areas than rural areas, although a marked positive 
trend in urban–rural inequality since the mid-1990s is still evident. 
In common with most countries, the bulk of the analysis of poverty and inequality in 
China (and India) has relied on repeated cross-sectional surveys, in which the samples at each 
date are treated as independent. Thus one does not track the living standards of the same 
households over time. We do not then know how much of the poverty at one date is persistent, 
and how much is transient (reflecting fluctuations in living standards, including movements in 
and out of poverty). (Some lessons from panel data studies will be reviewed later in the paper.) 
Lack of public access to the micro data for China has restricted the ability of researchers 
to try to address these data concerns. However, the micro data have been available for some 
selected provinces and time periods. Ravallion and Chen (1999) used the micro data for four 
provinces of southern China to correct for both the valuation methods for consumption of own 
product and the deflators. The corrections to the original survey data tend to entail lower 
measured inequality and they attenuate the rate of increase in inequality over time. 
Not all the likely data problems mean a lower true level of inequality or a lower rate of 
increase over time. For example, if we could correct for selective compliance (whereby the 
                                                 
2   Until the mid-1990s, public procurement prices for grain were held below market prices. Using these prices 
to value own consumption over-estimates the true extent of both poverty and inequality. This practice was largely 
abandoned from 1990s onwards in favor of using local selling prices for valuation.    5
relatively well off are less well represented in surveys) then we may well find higher inequality.
3 
However, we currently have no basis correcting for this problem in either China or India. 
Poverty monitoring in India since the 1960s has been mainly based on the household 
expenditure surveys done as part of the National Sample Surveys (NSS). The salient features are 
that household consumption expenditure per person is used as the individual welfare indicator 
and the poverty line that is intended to have a fixed real value across time and space (urban and 
rural areas of states) is determined by combined geographic and inter-temporal deflators. The 
main data issue is that assessing what has been happening to poverty and inequality in India 
during the 1990s has been clouded by a comparability problem between the two main surveys 
available for the 1990s.
4 
There are concerns about how well surveys measure incomes or consumptions. Survey-
based consumption and income aggregates for nationally representative samples typically do not 
match the aggregates obtained from national accounts (NA). This is to be expected for GDP, 
which includes non-household sources of domestic absorption. Possibly more surprising are the 
discrepancies found with both the levels and growth rates of private consumption in the NA 
aggregates; Ravallion (2003) provides evidence. The discrepancies between levels and growth 
rates of consumption as measured by India’s NSS and NA have been of particular concern, Yet 
here too it should be noted that (as measured in practice) private consumption in the NA includes 
sizeable and rapidly growing components that are typically missing from surveys (Deaton, 
2005).
5 However, aside from differences in what is being measured, surveys do encounter 
problems of under-reporting (particularly for incomes; the problem appears to be less serious for 
consumptions) and the aforementioned problems of selective non-response.
6 
There are also a number of data problems in making comparisons between these 
countries. These include that fact that China has traditionally used household income (per capita) 
as the ranking variable while India has used consumption (per capita). (We return to this point 
when we compare inequality measures.) Also, the available data on spatial differences in the 
cost-of-living are still rather weak in both countries. And purchasing power comparisons 
between the two countries are confounded by a number of concerns about the underlying price 
data and standard index-number problems. We will largely ignore these data problems in this 
paper, although that is not because we think them unimportant; rather, it is because this paper is 
not the place to dwell on them. 
                                                 
3   This is not necessarily the case, but there is supportive evidence for the US (Korinek et al., 2006). 
4   The comparability problem is discussed in Deaton (2001), Datt and Ravallion (2002) and Sen and 
Hiamnshu (2004a).  
5   Deaton and Kozel (2005) provide a useful compilation of papers on this and related issues of poverty 
measurement in India. 
6   In measuring poverty some researchers have replaced the survey mean by the mean from the national 
accounts (GDP or consumption per capita); see, for example, Bhalla (2002) and Sala-i-Martin (2002). This assumes 
that the discrepancy is distribution neutral, which is unlikely to be the case; for example, selective non-response to 
surveys can generate highly non-neutral errors (Korinek et al., 2005). For further discussion in the context of 
poverty measurement in India see Ravallion (2000).    6
However, one data-related issue that should be flagged is how well conventional 
inequality measures capture the significance that is often attached to certain between-group 
inequalities. Naturally, any conventional inequality measure puts weight on such differences. 
However, it is far from obvious that those weights accord well with the significance attached to 
between-group inequalities, as argued by Kanbur (2001). While this raises a number of deeper 
questions about individualism and the role of group identities that are beyond our present scope, 
we will note the extra significance attached to certain between-group disparities in both China 
and India. 
2.  Ways in which growth has been uneven 
Growth in China and India over the last quarter century has indeed been uneven, which 
has been apparent in several (related) dimensions, with implications for inequality, poverty 
reduction and human development in the two countries. This section makes four claims: 
•  Growth was uneven across states in India and provinces in China and this has meant 
uneven progress against poverty. 
•  Growth has been sectorally uneven, with primary sector growth rates lagging behind 
growth rates in the secondary and tertiary sectors in both China and India, and with rural 
incomes growing more slowly than urban incomes. 
•  There has also been uneven growth at the household level. In particular, incomes at the 
top of the distribution increased much faster than those at the bottom in both countries. 
That has meant rising inequality—dramatically so in the case of China. 
•  Because the more rapid growth of both countries has been so uneven in these dimensions, 
it has sometimes brought disappointing outcomes in terms of progress against poverty 
and other (“non-income”) dimensions of well-being. 
Growth has been geographically uneven 
The aggregate growth performances of China and India mask considerable unevenness of 
growth at the sub-national level. Chinese provincial GDP growth rates (between 1978 and 2004) 
ranged from a low of 5.9 percent in Qinghai to a high of 13.3 percent in Zhejiang. In India, 
among the 16 major states, Bihar (including the newly created state of Jharkand) had the lowest 
growth rate, namely 2.2 percent, while Karnataka had the highest, 7.2 percent. 
While state and provincial-level growth rates in the last twenty-five years have been 
higher and less volatile than in prior decades—for instance, in India, except for the Green 
Revolution states of Punjab and Haryana and the state of Maharashtra, growth rates before the 
1980s were at most 2 percent per annum—the variation in growth rates has meant increasing 
regional disparities in both countries. The increase has been more pronounced in the case of   7
India where states that were initially poorer have grown more slowly, resulting in unconditional 
divergence in both absolute and relative terms.
7 This is apparent in figure 2, which plots the 
average annual growth rate of real per-capita state GDP against a state’s initial per-capita GDP 
relative to the poorest state. India’s poorer states are still experiencing positive growth, but the 
high growth rates, post reform, have been elsewhere. 
 









1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0
Per-capita GDP of province(state) in 1978(1980)










































































Indian states Chinese provinces
 
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook (various years); Central Survey Organization, Government of India 
In China, provinces that were initially poorer have managed to keep pace with the 
initially wealthier provinces in terms of aggregate growth rates (figure 2). That has meant no 
divergence in relative terms, but absolute differences across provinces have increased. There 
have also been signs of divergence regionally between the coastal and inland areas of China.
8  
…and that has meant uneven progress against poverty 
The spatial unevenness of growth has contributed to uneven progress against poverty in 
two ways. Firstly, because household-income growth has been closely associated with poverty 
reduction at the sub-national level in both India and China,
9 the fact that growth was 
geographically uneven has meant that progress against poverty was uneven as well, with some 
states and provinces seeing far more rapid reduction in poverty than others. In China, the coastal 
areas fared better than inland areas. The trend rate of decline in the poverty rate between 1981 
and 2001 was 8 percent per year for inland provinces, versus 17 percent for the coastal 
provinces. In India, most of the western and southern states—peninsular India (with the 
exception of Andhra Pradesh)—did comparatively well, while the more backward BIMARU 
                                                 
7   Econometric tests indicating more marked growth divergence for India in the post-reform period can be 
found in Ghosh (2006).  
8   See Chen and Fleisher (1996), Jian et al. (1996), Sun and Dutta (1997), Raiser (1998) and Kanbur and 
Zhang (1999).  Milanovic (2005) describes the regional inequalities within five federations, including China and 
India. 
9   This is clearly documented for India by Datt and Ravallion (1996, 2002) and Deaton and Dreze (2002), and 
by Ravallion and Chen (2006) in the case of China.   8
states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, along with states in the eastern 
region, achieved relatively little poverty reduction between 1993–94 and 1999–2000. 
Secondly, in both countries, the most rapid growth did not occur where it would have had 
the most impact on poverty. This is evident if one compares growth rates across provinces with 
the growth elasticities of poverty reduction weighted by the initial shares of total poverty. (The 
weights assure that this gives the impact on national poverty of growth in a given province.) Had 
the pattern of growth favored provinces where growth would have had the greatest impact on 
poverty, we would find a negative correlation between the growth rate and the share-weighted 
elasticity. However, for neither country does one find any relationship, one way or the other (see 
Ravallion and Chen, 2006, for Chin and Datt and Ravallion, 2002, for India.) 
Growth has been sectorally uneven 
A second dimension of uneven growth in both countries is found across sectors. Growth 
rates in the primary sector (agriculture) have not only lagged behind those in the secondary 
(industry) and tertiary (services) sector, but have actually declined over the last quarter century 
(figure 3). 
…and the gap between rural and urban incomes has increased 
In nominal terms, urban incomes and expenditures have clearly increased faster than rural 
incomes over the past quarter century in both countries. In the case of India, this has been 
reflected in a steady increase in the ratio of urban to rural mean real consumption levels from just 
below 1.4 in 1983 to about 1.7 in 2000. Even in 1981, the urban-to-rural ratio of nominal mean 
incomes in China was around 2.5—much higher than it has ever been in India. And since then, 
while there have been periods when the ratio of urban-to-rural mean incomes fell, the overall 
trend has been upward. 
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Source:  China Statistical Yearbook (various years); Central Survey Organization, Government of India   9
Adjusting for cost-of-living differences clouds these trends somewhat. For China, the 
urban rate of inflation has been higher than for rural areas and once one allows for this fact, one 
no longer finds a trend increase over time in the ratio of the urban mean to the rural mean 
(Ravallion and Chen, 2006).
10 However, there have been sub-periods, including the period from 
1997 to the present, during which the relative urban-rural disparity has risen. Moreover, even 
allowing for cost-of-living differences, the absolute gap between rural and urban incomes has 
increased appreciably. This is also true of India. 
…and that meant less poverty reduction than if growth had been more sectorally balanced 
The sectoral composition of growth mattered for poverty reduction in both countries. 
This can be seen from table 1, which provides regressions of the rate of change in poverty over 
time (that is, the difference in the log of the headcount rate of poverty) on both the overall rate of 
per-capita GDP growth (that is, the change in the log of GDP per-capita), as well as the share-
weighted rates of growth of GDP in each of the three sectors. The sector-specific growth rates 
are share-weighted, to allow for the fact that sectors growing at the same rate are unlikely to have 
the same aggregate impacts when one accounts for a much smaller share of aggregate income 
than the other. When share-weighted, one obtains a straightforward testable hypothesis for 
whether the composition of growth matter, namely that the regression coefficients across growth 
components would be roughly equal (Ravallion and Datt, 1996). Note that these regressions are 
best viewed as decomposition tools rather than causal models of poverty reduction. Deeper 
explanations must endogenize growth rates and their composition; Ravallion and Chen (2006) 
provide models of poverty reduction in China that try to make some progress in that direction. 
 
Table 1: Poverty reduction and the sectoral composition of growth: China and India 
  China India 
–2.60 n.a.  n.a. –0.99 n.a.  Growth rate of GDP per capita 
(–2.16)    (–3.38)  
n.a. –8.07  –7.85 n.a. –1.16  Primary (share-weighted) 
 (–3.97)  (–4.09)  (–2.96) 
n.a. –1.75 n.a.  n.a.  3.41  Secondary (share-weighted) 
 (–1.21)    (1.84) 
n.a. –3.08 n.a.  n.a. –3.42  Tertiary (share-weighted) 
 (–1.24)    (–2.74) 
n.a.  n.a. –2.25 n.a.  n.a.  Secondary + tertiary 
   (–2.20)    
<I>R<I><+>
2<+>  0.21 0.43 0.42  0.75 
Source: Ravallion and Chen (2006) for China (1981–2001) and Ravallion and Datt (1996) for India (1951–1991). 
Note:  t-ratios in parentheses. 
 
                                                 
10   There are other data problems with ambiguous implications for urban-rural disparities. The undercounting 
of rural migrants in China’s urban areas is likely to lead to an overestimation of the level and growth rate in the ratio 
of the urban mean to the rural mean. Against this effect, urban survey response rates tend to be lower than for rural 
areas and it be safely assumed that the rich tend to have lower response rates. Our discussions with the staff of 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics suggest that this problem is growing over time in China.    10
For China, the overall elasticity of the headcount index to GDP growth was –2.6. 
However, when one decomposes growth by sector, it is clear that its composition mattered 
greatly to the rate of poverty reduction. The impact of growth in the primary sector was far 
higher (by a factor of about four) than for growth in either the secondary or tertiary sectors. The 
impacts of the latter two sectors are similar. 
For India, too, the sectoral composition of growth was important, although tertiary sector 
growth was relatively more important than in the case of China.
11 This probably reflects the 
difference between the two countries in the distribution of agricultural land. In rural China, 
starting conditions at the outset of the reform process entailed relatively low levels of inequality 
in access to land. The de-collectivization process that started in the late 1970s achieved a 
relatively equal allocation of access to agricultural land, at least within communes. (Between 
communes, the only way to equalize land allocation would have been to allow mobility of 
people, which was not considered a desirable option.) This meant that agricultural growth was a 
powerful instrument against poverty and inequality in China (Ravallion and Chen, 2006). The 
distribution of agricultural land was and is clearly more unequal in India, and that naturally 
attenuates the impact of agricultural growth on poverty relative to that found in China. Note also 
that India’s overall growth elasticity of poverty reduction is appreciably lower than China’s 
(table 1). 
 
Table 2: Poverty reduction and the urban–rural composition of growth 
 China  India 
–2.56 –1.46  Growth rate of mean rural income (share-weighted)  
(–8.43) (12.64) 
0.09 –0.55  Growth rate of mean urban income (share-weighted)  
(0.20) (–1.37) 
0.74 –4.46  Population shift effect  
(0.16) (–1.31) 
R
2  0.82 0.90 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses. 
Source: Ravallion and Datt (1996) (for India) and Ravallion and Chen (2006) (for China). 
 
Increases in rural incomes, whether from agricultural growth or (particularly in the case 
of China) from increased rural non-farm employment, also turn out to have been critical for 
overall poverty reduction. Table 2 gives regressions of the rate of change in poverty over time 
(difference in the log headcount index) on the share-weighted growth rates of rural and urban 
mean incomes and a term capturing the effect of any shifts in population from rural to urban 
areas. It can be seen that in both countries, growth in rural incomes is the only statistically 
significant correlate of poverty reduction. Ravallion and Chen (2006) also report an alternative 
decomposition for China, which exploits the analytic (additivity) properties of the headcount 
index, whereby the national index is the population-weighted mean of the urban and rural 
                                                 
11   Note that the coefficients on secondary and tertiary-sector growth for India are of approximately equal size 
but opposite sign (table 1). This suggests that the (share-weighted) difference in growth rates is picking up a 
distributional effect on poverty reduction.   11
indices. This decomposition makes somewhat different assumptions to the regression 
decomposition. However, it confirms the quantitative importance of rural economic growth; 
about 72 percent of the reduction in the headcount index that occurred in China between 1981 
and 2001 is attributable to rural poverty reduction, versus 5 percent due to urban and 23 percent 
due to the population shift from rural to urban areas. 
The results in tables 1 and 2 imply that the particular form of sectorally uneven growth 
China and India experienced—primary sector growth rates lagging behind growth rates in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors, and rural incomes growing more slowly than urban incomes—has 
meant less poverty reduction than might have been the case otherwise. A sense of how much 
extra poverty reduction might have been achieved from a more balanced growth path can be 
obtained through counterfactual simulations in which it is assumed that all three sectors grow 
equally—meaning that the sector shares of GDP in 1981 would have remained constant over 
time—and the estimates from table 1 are used to calculate the implied rate of poverty reduction 
under different assumptions about the overall (common) rate of GDP growth. So, for instance, 
had it been possible to achieve a balanced growth path while maintaining the GDP growth rates 
China actually achieved between 1981 and 2001, the mean rate of poverty reduction would then 
have been 16.3 percent per year, rather than 9.5 percent. Instead of 20 years to bring the 
headcount index down from 53 percent to 8 percent it would have taken about 10 years. 
A similar exercise for India suggests that were it not for the sectoral and geographic 
imbalance of growth, the national rate of growth since reforms began in full force in the early 
1990s would have generated a rate of poverty reduction that was double India’s historical trend 
rate (Datt and Ravallion, 2002). The evidence also suggests that states with relatively low levels 
of initial rural development and human capital development experienced lower elasticities of 
poverty reduction to economic growth (Ravallion and Datt, 2002). 
Of course one can question whether in fact a more sectorally balanced growth path could 
have been achieved without lowering the overall growth rate, and so this exercise should be 
viewed as an upper bound on what might have been possible. There do appear to be signs of a 
sectoral tradeoff in that the correlation between China’s primary sector growth rates and the 
combined growth rate of the secondary and tertiary sector was –0.414 over this period, implying 
that a more balanced growth path in which the growth rate of the primary sector was higher 
might have meant less growth overall. But it is worth noting that the negative correlation is 
statistically quite weak—a significance level of 6 percent—and that there were sub-periods 
(1983–84, 1987–88 and 1994–96) in which both primary sector growth and combined growth in 
the secondary and tertiary sectors were both above average.  Later we return to the question of 
whether either country faces an aggregate growth-equity trade-off. 
Income growth has been uneven across households 
The unevenness of economic growth across households at different levels of living can be 
seen clearly in the growth incidence curve (GIC), which gives the annualized rate of growth over 
the relevant time period at each percentile of the distribution (ranked by income or consumption   12
per person).
12 Figure 4 displays the growth incidence curves for China and India, for the periods 
1990 to 1999 and 1993 to 1999, respectively. In both cases, growth rates at the bottom of the 
distribution were lower than those at the top. The gradient is less steep for India.
13 Growth rates 
in China in the 1990s rise sharply as we move up the income ladder, with the annual rate of 
growth in the 1990s increasing from about 3 percent for the poorest percentile to over 10 percent 
for the richest. While the growth rate in the overall mean was 6.2 percent, the mean growth rate 
for the poorest 20 percent (roughly according with China’s “$1 a day” poverty rate in 1995) was 
4.0 percent. The GIC for India between 1993 and 1999 shows a slight U shape, with the lowest 
growth rates—around 1 percent—for people around the 10
th percentile, and a smaller difference 
between growth rates at the top (close to 4 percent) and those at the bottom (just over 1 percent) 
than was the case for China. 
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Source: Ravallion and Chen (2003) for China (using household income) and Ravallion (2004b) for India (household 
expenditure on consumption). 
As we have noted, large sample nationally representative surveys (such as used to 
construct figure 4) do not typically pick up what is happening at the extreme upper tails of the 
distribution. In the case of India, evidence from other sources indicates that incomes at the top 
end have risen dramatically. For instance, Banerjee and Piketty (2005), based on a study of tax 
returns, report that the super-rich in India—that is, those at the 99.99th percentile—experienced 
                                                 
12   On the precise definition and properties of the GIC see Ravallion and Chen (2003). 
13   The shape of the expenditure-GIC for India for the 1990s depends critically on what adjustment is made for 
the comparability problems between the 1999/2000 survey and earlier surveys. The GIC shown in Figure 5 is based 
on the estimates produced by Sundaram and Tendulkar (2003), who resolve the comparability problem by 
estimating consumption expenditures based on a common “mixed reference period” for categories of consumption. 
The rural and urban distributions were then aggregated assuming urban-rural cost-of-living differentials of 33 
percent and 38 percent for 1993/94 and 1999/00 respectively, based on updated poverty lines as used in Ravallion 
and Datt (2002). This roughly matches the GIC implied by estimates obtained by Deaton (2001), who uses an 
alternative method to make the surveys comparable. If, however, no attempt is made to correct for the comparability 
problem, and one simply uses the “unadjusted” primary estimates from each of the surveys, the GIC suggests a 
much more pro-poor pattern of growth, with growth rates declining from over 2 percent for the poorest percentile to 
around 1 percent at the top of the distribution (Ravallion, 2004).   13
growth in incomes of over 285 percent between 1987/88 and 1999/00, resulting in annual PPP 
incomes of around P$160,000 per person. 
…and that has meant rising inequality 
Figure 5 displays the trends in income inequality for the two countries. From a cross-
country perspective, India remains a relatively low-income inequality country (World Bank, 
2005, 2006), although this is no longer true of China. The Gini index of income inequality for 
China rose from 28 percent in 1981 to 41 percent in 2003, though not continuously, and more in 
some periods and provinces.
14 
 







































Source:  Authors’ calculations for India and Ravallion and Chen (2006) for China. 
Note that the fact that the inequality measures for China use income while those for India 
use consumption (per capita) does not account for the difference in measured inequality as in 
figure 5. For a few years it is possible to measure inequality using consumption for China. When 
one does, the consumption-based inequality measure is only slightly lower than that based on 
incomes, and it is still appreciably higher than for India (Chen and Ravallion, 2006). 
In the case of India, one finds that the Gini index rose in the 1990s, although the increase 
was less pronounced than in China (figure 5).
15 However, it is too early to say if India is 
undergoing a trend increase in inequality similar to what China has experienced. As can be seen 
from figure 5, on looking back over time, rising inequality in India is seen to be a recent 
                                                 
14   Note that the latter figure is somewhat lower than past estimates for China; this is because corrections have 
been made for changes in survey-valuation methods (as discussed above) and urban-rural cost-of-living differences, 
which have tended to rise over time because of higher inflation in urban areas (as price controls and subsidies were 
progressively removed on certain goods, including housing). Without these corrections, the estimate of the Gini 
index for 2003 rises to over 45 percent instead of 41 percent. 
15   Figure 5 uses the NSS “thick samples” only. The thin samples for the 1990s also confirm the increase in 
inequality (Ravallion, 2000).   14
phenomenon.
16 Indeed, there is no statistically significant trend increase in consumption 
inequality in India up to the early 1990s (Bruno et al., 1998).
17 
Perceptions “on the ground” that inequality is rising markedly in India do not appear to 
sit easily with the impression given by figure 5. Popular opinion can be mistaken, but nor are the 
data perfect. As we have noted, the survey-based numbers may well understate the relative gains 
to the rich, and that is consistent with the evidence from tax returns. The visible changes in 
consumption patterns and lifestyles that the rich have achieved may well not be reflected 
properly in the survey-based inequality measures. Also, and possibly more importantly, the 
perception of sharply rising inequality in India may well also reflect rising absolute inequality, as 
reflected in the absolute gaps between the rich and the poor, as distinct form the proportionate 
gaps. There is evidence that many people view inequality in absolute terms rather than relative 
terms (Amiel and Cowell, 1999).
18 
The sectoral and geographic unevenness of growth has contributed to rising inequality 
Since both countries started their reform periods with sizeable rural–urban gaps in mean 
living standards, the unevenness of the subsequent growth process, in which urban incomes 
increased faster than rural incomes, is likely to have put upward pressure on aggregate 
inequality. The time series data and regressions presented in Ravallion and Chen (2006) provide 
direct evidence of this for China. Controlling for growth in rural and urban incomes, the rising 
urban population share has had no significant effect on aggregate inequality, and the periods 
when the urban–rural disparity in mean income rose (fell) were the periods when overall 
inequality rose (fell). But it would also seem that the rising urban–rural gap now has a salience in 
popular and governmental circles that far exceeds its likely contribution to a conventional 
inequality or poverty metric. This appears to stem in part from the (plausible) belief that the 
urban–rural divergence reflects (in part at least) urban biases in the reform processes and 
complementary public spending choices. This is reinforced by actual or perceived abuses of local 
political powers at the expense of poor farmers or the landless rural poor (the recurrent land 
disputes of land contracts and land-use conversions in rural China are examples).  
Similarly, regional inequality concerns loom large in both countries, although the 
quantitative importance of increasing disparities across regions (provinces and states) appears to 
be greater in India. While these between-group inequalities have carried weight in policy 
discussions, it is important to note that growing inequality within both urban and rural areas have 
been a major component of the increase in overall inequality; for China rising inequality within 
                                                 
16   Note that longer term comparisons are only possible using the uniform recall period data, using the Deaton 
method of correcting for the comparability problem in the 1999/00 data. 
17   At the time of writing, the 61
st round of the NSS, for 2004/5, has not yet been released. This will give a 
(keenly awaited) indication of whether the signs of rising inequality in the 1990s have been sustained. Only 
preliminary tabulated results were available to us at the time of writing, but they suggest that the increase in 
inequality in India since the early 1990s that is evident in figure 6.5 has continued through to 2005, and may well 
have accelerated, although this should be investigated more thoroughly when the micro data become available. 
18   For further discussion of the implications of the absolute-inequality concept for assessments of economic 
growth and reform see Ravallion (2004a) and Atkinson and Brandolini (2004).   15
rural areas has been an important dynamic in overall inequality while in India inequality has 
risen more within urban areas than rural areas. 
The sectoral composition of GDP growth—cutting across the urban and rural divide —is 
also a significant correlate of the changes in inequality. For instance, regressions of the sort 
reported in table 1, with share-weighted sectoral GDP growth rates as covariates, but with the 
change in inequality (change in the log of the Gini index) as the dependent variable indicate that 
in China, primary sector growth has been associated with lower inequality overall, while there is 
no correlation with growth in either the secondary or tertiary sectors (Ravallion and Chen, 2006). 
There is also evidence of a lagged primary-sector growth effect, with a similarly sized impact as 
the current year’s effect. Regressing the change in log Gini index on the two-year moving 
average of the primary sector growth rate one obtains an elasticity of the Gini index to primary-
sector growth of about –0.75 (t-ratio=-3.72). There is also a strong positive trend in inequality, of 
about 5 percent per annum, independently of the rate of primary-sector growth. 
How much higher would the rate of primary sector growth need to have been to stem the 
rise in aggregate inequality? The above elasticity implies that a (moving average) growth rate of 
7.0 percent per annum would be needed to avoid rising inequality, whereas the mean primary-
sector growth rate was 4.6 percent per annum between 1981 and 2001. Only in two periods, the 
early 1980s and the mid-1990s, were agricultural growth rates high enough to prevent rising 
inequality. The divergence between the actual growth rates in the primary sector GDP and the 
minimum needed to prevent rising inequality is particularly striking in the most recent period. 
The recent composition of economic growth in China has clearly been inequality increasing. 
It is too early to say with confidence that India’s (more recent) rise in inequality stems 
from similar factors. Nonetheless, we can be reasonably sure that the “urban bias” in India’s 
growth process since reforms began has put upward pressure on overall inequality. 
3.  Why growth was uneven and why this matters 
Why was growth uneven—in the aggregate as well as sectorally and geographically—and 
what is one to make of this unevenness? Should the fact that in both India and China, segments 
of the population appear to have been left behind (at least thus far) be of concern? And should 
we worry that inequality has risen? 
These questions are more easily posed than answered because of the multiple complex 
processes through which uneven growth and inequality are generated and reproduced. Policies 
play a role but so do initial conditions in the form of history (for example, inherited institutions) 
and geography (as a determinant of access to markets and public services). Economic forces are 
undoubtedly important, but so too are political and social factors. Answering these questions in a 
rigorous fashion is beyond the scope of this paper. What we can do, however, is provide an 
assessment based on our interpretation of the evidence from various sources.   16
We structure the discussion around a distinction between good and bad inequalities—
drivers and dimensions of uneven growth that are good or bad in terms of what they imply for 
how the living standards of poor people evolve over time. We argue that the post-reform 
development paths of both India and China have been influenced by and have generated both 
types of inequalities. 
Good inequalities 
Good inequalities are those that reflect and reinforce market-based incentives that are 
needed to foster innovation, entrepreneurship and growth. Scattered evidence suggests that the 
rise in inequality with the introduction of market reforms in both India and China is at least in 
part a reflection of newly-unleashed market-based incentives at work, in contrast with the earlier 
period of artificially low levels of inequality brought about by regulatory distortions and 
interventions that suppressed incentives for individual effort and innovation. 
Perhaps the leading example of the role that good inequalities (and the economic 
incentives that underlie them) have played in China’s growth is the stimulus to agricultural 
production in the early 1980s provided by the Household Responsibility System (HRS). Under 
the HRS, rural households were assigned plots of land and became the residual claimants on the 
output from that land, significantly enhancing the incentives for production. Prior to that, land 
had been farmed collectively, with all members sharing the output more-or-less equally. 
Incentives for individual effort in this setting were naturally very weak, and the reforms to this 
system were critical in stimulating rural economic growth at the early stages of China’s transition 
(Fan, 1991; Lin, 1992). Initially these reforms are likely to been inequality-reducing, by raising 
rural incomes relative to urban areas. However, soon some farm-households did better than 
others—depending on farming acumen, agro-climatic conditions and access to markets—putting 
upward pressure on inequality within rural areas. 
Another example is provided by Park et al. (2004) in their analysis of the substantial 
increase in urban wage dispersion in China during the current reform period. At the outset of that 
period, urban China had a system of fixed wage scales, allocation of labor by government and 
(hence) low returns to schooling (Fleisher and Wang, 2004). There were few incentives for 
work-effort or skill-acquisition. From this legacy of wage compression and low labor mobility, 
China moved gradually in the 1990s to a market-based system featuring a dynamic non-state 
sector and an increasingly open labor market. With reforms that expanded the scope for 
employment in a growing private sector and the emergence of a competitive labor market, wage 
dispersion within skill categories and experience cohorts has increased considerably and returns 
to schooling have also risen (Park et al., 2004; Heckman and Li, 2004). Looking forward, a 
further implication of the emergence of a more convex structure of returns to education in post-
reform China (whereby the increase in returns to education has tended to be at higher levels of 
schooling) is that generalized increases in the level of schooling will put upward pressure on 
aggregate inequality, though they will probably be poverty reducing. In India, too, one sees 
growing variance in wages, attributable in part to increasing wage dispersion within educational 
attainment categories, which in turn reflect increasingly competitive product and labor markets 
(Dutta, 2005).   17
Yet another example of how increasing disparities might reflect the growth-enhancing 
role of incentives comes from considering the increasing variation in the growth performance of 
Indian states during the 1990s, when some states significantly accelerated their growth, while 
others lagged behind. Both Ahluwalia (2000) and Kohli (2006) conjecture that the increase can 
be attributed, at least in part, to the greater responsiveness of private investment flows to 
differences in the investment climate in different states. As Kohli (2006) notes, that in turn 
appears to have provided—subject to the constraints imposed by state-level political 
considerations and capacity—some incentives to state leaders to adopt measures to improve the 
business environment, to woo private investment. This stands in contrast to earlier periods when 
the share of public investment in total investment was much larger. 
There is evidence that the impact of incentives was magnified by the presence of 
agglomeration economies in industrial activity in India. Lall and Chakravorty (2005) show that 
industrial diversity (which is higher in metropolitan and mixed industrial regions) has cost-
reducing effects, through agglomeration economies. Because of this, private industrial units 
favored locating in existing high-density industrial areas, increasing the degree of industrial 
clustering. On the other hand, the location decisions of state-owned industry appeared to have 
been much less driven by these cost considerations and were possibly motivated by a desire for 
greater regional balance. The conclusion that Lall and Chakravorty draw is that the reforms and 
the scaling back of public investments, and the emergence of the private sector as the primary 
source of new industrial investments that was associated with it, contributed to higher levels of 
spatial inequality in industrial activity. 
Bad inequalities 
The processes underway in India and China are almost certainly less benign and less 
automatic than the account above suggests. Geographic poverty traps, patterns of social 
exclusion, unequal opportunities for enhancing human capital, lack of access to credit and 
insurance, corruption and uneven influence can all conspire to simultaneously fuel rising 
inequality and prevent certain segments of the population from making the transition out of 
traditional low-productivity activities. Credit market failures often lie at the root of the problem; 
it is poor people who tend to be most constrained in financing lumpy investments in human and 
physical capital. These bad inequalities—rooted in market failures, coordination failures and 
governance failures—prevent individuals from connecting to markets and limit investment in 
human and physical capital.
19 
We focus on two dimensions of bad inequalities. The first relates to location in the 
presence of externalities, impediments to mobility and heavy dependence of local states on local 
resources. These features can generate geographic poverty traps whereby living in a well-
endowed area entails that a poor household can eventually escape poverty, while an otherwise 
identical household living in a poor area sees stagnation or decline. This is one possible reason 
why initially poorer provinces have often seen lower subsequent growth (figure 6). 
                                                 
19   World Bank (2005, Chapter 5) provides a useful overview of the arguments and evidence on how certain 
inequalities can be inefficient, notably when they entail unequal opportunities for advancement.  Also see the 
excellent overview of the theoretical arguments in Aghion et al. (1999).   18
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Source:  China Statistical Yearbook (various years); Central Survey Organization, Government of India 
While these observations from aggregate data are suggestive that such traps might exist, 
they can hardly be considered conclusive. More rigorous micro evidence of the geographic 
externalities that underlie such traps can be found in Jalan and Ravallion (2002) and Ravallion 
(2005), using farm-household panel data for rural China. The geographic attributes conducive to 
individual prospects of escaping poverty include both publicly-controlled endowments (such as 
the density of rural roads) and largely private ones (such as the extent of agricultural 
development locally). 
The second dimension of undoubted importance relates to inequalities in human resource 
development—often linked to credit market failures on the demand side but also reflecting 
governmental failures in service delivery. We argued above that the rising returns to schooling 
and increasing dispersion of wages represent ‘good’ inequalities because they reflect freer labor 
markets with increased incentives for work and skill-acquisition. But naturally, those with 
relatively little schooling and few assets, or little access to credit are less able to respond these 
incentives and are less well positioned to take advantage of the new opportunities unleashed by 
market-oriented reforms. And thus, inequalities in human capital are ‘bad ineqaulities’ in that 
they have retarded poverty reduction through growth in both countries.
20  
Basic schooling was far more widespread in China at the outset of the reform period than 
in India, and China has achieved close to universal primary education. But inequalities in 
educational attainment beyond primary school remain, and these have become an increasingly 
important source of disadvantage because a junior high school education, and in some instances, 
a senior high school education, has become a de facto prerequisite for accessing non-farm work 
particularly in urban areas, where wages far exceed the shadow wages in farming. Thus, lack of 
                                                 
20   Note that the claim that inequalities in human capital are “bad” is not inconsistent with our earlier point that 
certain inequalities in outcomes, reflected for instance in increasing wage dispersion, are “good.”  The latter stem 
from variation in returns that reflect differences in effort. The former arises from differences in endowments that are 
the results of both supply-side governmental failures and demand-side market failures (especially credit-market 
failures).   19
schooling is now a very important constraint on prospects of escaping poverty in China, as 
elsewhere. 
India’s schooling inequalities are clearly larger than those of China (both at the beginning 
of the reform period and since).
21 Inequality of schooling attainments has clearly been an 
important factor inhibiting pro-poor growth. The differences we have seen in the impacts of non-
farm economic growth on poverty reflect inequalities in a number of dimensions; low farm 
productivity, low rural living standards relative to urban areas and poor basic education all 
inhibited the prospects of the poor participating in growth of the non-farm sector (Ravallion and 
Datt, 2002). Interstate differences in initial levels of schooling appear to have been the dominant 
factor in explaining the subsequent impacts of non-farm economic growth on poverty. Those 
with relatively little schooling and few assets, or little access to credit, were less well positioned 
to take advantage of the new opportunities unleashed by market-oriented reforms. 
Policy impediments, policy biases and policy neglect 
Errors of both omission and commission in policy have contributed to the unevenness of 
growth in both countries, and the failure of growth to translate into larger impacts on poverty and 
human development. These errors have taken one of three forms: first, policies that have 
impeded the functioning of markets; second, policies that have been biased in favor of particular 
regions or industries; and third, policies that have neglected certain spheres of activity where 
public interventions were in fact necessary. 
In India, it has been argued that restrictive labor regulations and widespread preferences 
in favor of small-scale industries are impediments to more broad-based growth. While motivated 
(ostensibly) by distributive considerations, these policies are believed to have instead restricted 
firm growth, dampened job creation and hindered the movement of labor out of agriculture in 
India (World Bank, 2006). Only eight million workers are protected by this legislation, in a 
country of one billion; “Current labor regulations seem to be protecting workers in jobs by 
‘protecting’ other workers from having jobs.” (World Bank, 2006, p.17). These regulations are 
unlikely to have helped labor absorption, and may well have helped create a situation in which 
the fraction of the labor force in India that remains in agriculture far exceeds that of other 
countries with similar shares of agricultural value added (Virmani, 2005). And despite the 
increase in GDP growth, the rate of job creation in India has failed in recent years to keep up 
with increases in the size of the labor force, which has led some to characterize India’s growth 
experience as “jobless growth” (Mehta, 2003). While these observations are suggestive, the costs 
to the poor of these policies have yet to be rigorously quantified. 
In China, impediments to the movement of labor out of agriculture through internal 
migration have come in part from governmental restrictions under the houkou system, whereby a 
person has to have an official registration to reside in an urban area and use its facilities. Those 
born with an agricultural registration have historically had a hard time obtaining urban 
                                                 
21   Evidence supporting this claim can be found in World Bank (2005).   20
registration.
22 Other costs of migration facing rural households include the risk of losing one’s 
(administratively allocated) land allocation at the origin and various forms of discrimination 
against rural migrants in urban areas. A rough estimate of the magnitude of these policy-induced 
costs of migration is provided by Shi et al., (2004) who report that even after controlling for 
worker characteristics and cost-of-living differences provide, urban wages are about 50 percent 
higher. The high costs of migration underlying these gaps have probably been both poverty and 
inequality increasing. There are also similar restrictions on within-rural and within-urban 
migration.  
Sizeable aggregate output losses from these inequality-increasing restrictions on 
migration are likely. Not only is labor mis-allocated across sectors, but the restrictions make it 
harder for China to realize agglomeration economies (Au and Henderson, 2006). Under the 
(plausible) assumption that these costs of migration lower earnings in the poorer (labor-surplus) 
sector, they will increase poverty and inequality. Other policy biases against the poor have 
included public spending and industrial policies that have favored China’s coastal areas over the 
(poorer) inland regions. 
In both countries, an important area of policy neglect has been service delivery. The 
deficiencies of India’s education system (and not just from the point of view of the poor) are well 
known (Drèze and Sen, 1995; PROBE, 1999). Issues of service quality loom large in these 
concerns (World Bank, 2006). While starting from greater equity in service delivery (though 
even then with large gaps between urban and rural areas) China has also seen growing 
inequalities in access to health and education (Zhang and Kanbur, 2005). The weaknesses and 
inter-regional disparities in service delivery in both countries can be traced, at least in part, to the 
large and rising disparities in public spending per capita between rich and poor areas, with rather 
weak fiscal redistribution and (hence) heavy dependence of local governments on local 
resources.  We return to this point when we discuss policies. 
Dynamics: Good inequalities can turn into bad ones 
Without the appropriate institutional checks and balances, rising inequality, even if it is 
initially of the “good” variety, can engender phenomena such as corruption, crony capitalism, 
rent-seeking or efforts by those who benefit initially from the new opportunities to restrict access 
of others to those opportunities or alter the rules of the game so as to preserve their initial 
advantages.
23  Thus bad inequalities emerge over time. 
The growth and subsequent performance of China’s township and village enterprises 
(TVEs) provides an example of this dynamic at work. The emergence and growth of TVEs in 
various parts of China starting in the mid-1980s is often cited as a successful example of the 
country’s strategy of incremental institutional innovation—in this case, economic 
                                                 
22   In spite of this, China has still had a more rapid rate of urbanization than has India. China’s urban 
population share rose from 19 percent in 1980 to 39 percent in 2002. In India (with no such restrictions) the urban 
share of the population rose from 23 percent to 28 percent over the same period.  
23   Antecedents to this argument can be found in the writings of North (1990) and Hellman (1998).   21
decentralization under which local governments were given the right to establish TVEs and 
retain the profits generated by them (Oi, 1999). The implied autonomy and control, combined 
with a hard budget constraint imposed from above provided exactly the right incentives at the 
outset to invest and operate efficiently. The resultant increase in rural non-farm output and 
employment, was spatially uneven, but probably inequality reducing overall (given the rural base 
for this innovation) and contributed to China’s growth up to the mid-1990s. 
However, with the proliferation of TVEs and the increased competition this implied in 
various product categories, pressures emerged for local and provincial governments to protect 
the (local) markets of the TVEs and enterprises under their control. The result was increasing 
impediments to inter-jurisdictional trade and to entry by outside firms, leading to fragmentation 
of China’s domestic product and factor markets and a deterioration in the investment climate in 
many localities (World Bank, 2005). 
Perceptions and tolerance for inequality: The “bad” can drive out the “good” 
Bad inequalities are doubly harmful. First, they directly reduce the potential for growth 
because segments of the population are left behind, lacking the opportunity to contribute to the 
growth process. Second, on top of these direct human and economic costs, persistent bad 
inequalities in a setting of heightened aspirations can yield negative perceptions about the 
benefits of reform. Because it is difficult for citizens to disentangle the sources of the aggregate 
inequality in observed outcomes—to determine whether the underlying drivers are good or 
bad—societal intolerance for inequality of any kind emerges. And that can trigger social unrest 
or harden resistance to further needed reforms, thereby (indirectly) threatening the sustainability 
of growth. In effect, the persistence of bad inequalities drives out the good ones. 
In China, Han and Whyte (2006) report results of a survey of over 3,000 Chinese adults 
interviewed in 2004; 40 percent of respondents “strongly agreed” that inequality in the country 
as a whole is “too large” while a further 32 percent “agreed somewhat” with this view. An 
astonishing 80 percent favored “governmental leveling” to assure a “minimum standard of 
living” (split roughly equally between “strong agree” and “agree somewhat”). Interestingly, the 
correlates of perceptions of unfair inequalities did not suggest that the concern was greatest 
among those most disadvantaged, such as farmers or migrants from rural areas. Also notable is 
that most respondents did feel that education, ability and effort were rewarded in China. 
Such high levels of concern about inequality do not imply dissatisfaction with the 
distributive outcomes of economic reforms. However, there are also signs that perceptions of (or 
direct experience with) bad inequalities is translating into growing dissatisfaction with reforms in 
both countries. Social protests about various perceived injustices are becoming common in 
China. Land disputes have been especially common in rural and peri-urban areas, where the 
poorly-defined land rights of farmers leave ample opportunities for local officials and developers 
to expropriate a large share of the rent from land-use conversions. In a poll conducted by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2002, 60 percent of the 15,000 respondents thought that 
party and government officials had benefited the most from reforms, while other polls (cited in 
Pei, 2006) consistently rank corruption as one of the most serious problems facing China. In   22
examining the economic underpinnings of social unrest in China, Keidel (2005) makes the point 
that dissatisfaction with the economic dislocations caused by reforms, which are a necessary part 
of engendering good inequalities, have been amplified by corruption and malfeasance within 
state-owned enterprises and local governments. Police records reported in official bulletins cited 
by Gill (2006) indicate that the number of collective protests, violent confrontations and 
demonstrations deemed to be incidents of social unrest has risen nearly tenfold from 8,300 in 
1993 to almost 80,000 in 2005. Pei (2006) argues that these indications of social discontent have 
made it that much more difficult for China to undertake the reforms needed to address remaining 
structural weaknesses, notably in the financial system—reforms that a study by the IMF (2003) 
suggest might be critical to sustaining growth. Thus, Pei (2006) talks of China’s “trapped 
transition.” 
In India, the political failure of the “Shining India” electoral campaign of the BJP in 2004 
has been widely attributed to its neglect of the emerging inequalities in the wake of pro-growth 
reforms. Such attributions are always questionable, but there is also evidence from attitudinal 
surveys suggesting that rising inequality is a popular concern in India. In a 2004 National 
Election Survey, three quarters of the respondents indicated that the reforms of the past decade 
and a half had only benefited the rich (Suri, 2004). Within India’s democratic polity, such 
sentiments have resulted in political pressures that have forced the government to postpone 
needed reforms (Bardhan, 2005). For instance, last year the government had to withdraw plans to 
privatize 13 leading industrial public-sector undertakings. The concerns about rising inequality 
and slow progress against poverty have also led to various new antipoverty programs, which we 
return to. 
4.  Preserving the good inequalities and reducing the bad ones 
Putting in place the right mix of policies and institutions to ensure that growth is 
sustained and broad-based is now high on the policy agenda of both governments. While 
inequality has been prominent in (at least) the rhetoric of Indian politics for decades, it is a 
relatively new concern in China, although it has emerged as a major concern in recent years.
24 
Should policy makers be so worried about rising inequality? Possibly it is inevitable to 
some degree. Over five decades ago, Arthur Lewis (1954) observed that the defining feature of 
structural transformation in economies with large pools of surplus labor is the gradual transfer of 
surplus labor from “traditional” low-productivity activities to “modern” high-productivity 
activities. Lewis argued that this process is inevitably accompanied initially by rising levels of 
inequality as some make the transition and others are, at least temporarily, left behind.
25 As 
                                                 
24   Han and Whyte (2006) quote results of a survey in 2004 of senior public officials done by the Communist 
Party’s Central Party School which found that income inequality was the highest expressed concern, dominating all 
other issues..  
25   The dimensions along which this productivity divide are manifested—rural vs. urban, traditional vs. 
modern agriculture, agriculture vs. industry, etc.—will naturally vary from context to context, even within a country. 
And which dimensions are most relevant will clearly matter for thinking about policy. The larger point, however, is 
that there is some axis along which the dualism is manifested.   23
Lewis put it: “Development must be inegalitarian because it does not start in every part of the 
economy at the same time.” 
If indeed what we are witnessing in China and India is such a process of structural 
transformation, it may only be a matter of time before those left behind catch up. The rise in 
inequality would then be a transitional phenomenon, although because the transition is occurring 
on a decadal scale (even for a rapidly changing society and economy such as China’s), inequality 
might continue to rise for several more years. And even when the transition is complete, because 
of the good drivers of inequality set in motion by the reforms, there will almost certainly be an 
increase in the steady-state inequality relative to that in the pre-reform period. 
However, as this paper has argued, there are also a number of reasons to suggest that 
policy makers concerned with assuring rising absolute levels of living, especially for the poor, 
should be concerned about the “bad inequalities.” In the this section we try to provide a simple 
conceptual framework for thinking about what policy makers in China and India should do about 
rising inequality, and review some of the policy options, including those recently implemented in 
both countries. 
Defining the challenge and avoiding misdiagnoses 
We take it to be self-evident that that the objective is sustainable pro-poor growth, by 
which we mean growth that benefits poor people, so as to bring large and lasting reductions in 
the extent of absolute poverty. Efforts to attenuate the bad inequalities should not then 
undermine the drivers of good inequality to the point where the longer-term living standards of 
poor are threatened. The challenge will be to identify the mix of policies that directly target the 
bad inequalities without undermining the good ones. 
From that starting point, it is clear that we should not accept redistributive policies that 
come at the expense of lower longer-term living standards for poor people. Accepting that there 
is no aggregate trade-off between mean income and inequality does not mean that there are no 
trade-offs at the level of specific policies. Reducing inequality by adding further distortions to an 
economy may well have ambiguous effects on growth and poverty reduction. But nor should it 
be presumed that there will be such a trade-off with all redistributive policies. The potential for 
“win-win” policies stems from the fact that some of the factors that impede growth also entail 
that the poor share less in the opportunities unleashed by growth. More rapid poverty reduction 
requires a combination of more growth, a more pro-poor pattern of growth and success in 
reducing the antecedent inequalities that limit the prospects for poor people to share in the 
opportunities unleashed by a growth economy. 
Learning from the past: Avoiding false tradeoffs 
The experience of China and India over the last quarter century offers important lessons 
regarding the broad policy directions that are necessary and possible. The first is that the idea of 
an aggregate tradeoff between growth and equity is often, though not always, a false one. As we   24
have argued above, the trade off exists for certain inequalities but not others. The right 
combination of policies can yield win-win-win combinations of growth, reduction in poverty and 
declining (or at least non-increasing) inequality. 
Testing for the existence of an aggregate growth-equity trade off poses a number of 
analytic problems. In the case of China, it is at least suggestive that on comparing growth rates 
with changes in inequality over time one finds no sign that higher inequality has been the price 
of China’s high growth. The correlation between the growth rate of GDP and log difference in 
the Gini index is only –0.05; the regression coefficient has a t-ratio of only 0.22. This test does 
not suggest that higher growth per se meant a steeper rise in inequality. While the level of 
inequality rose at the same time that average income rose, this reflects their common time trends 
rather than genuine co-movement. The periods of more rapid growth did not bring more rapid 
increases in inequality; indeed, the periods of falling inequality (1981–85 and 1995–98) had the 
highest growth in average household income. Also, the sub-periods of highest growth in the 
primary sector (1983–84, 1987–88 and 1994–96) did not come with lower growth in other 
sectors (Ravallion and Chen, 2006). Nor does one find that the provinces with more rapid rural 
income growth experienced a steeper increase in inequality; if anything it was the opposite. 
The sources of higher primary sector growth rates in China were probably very different 
between the early 1980s and the mid 1990s. In the former period, agricultural growth was 
stimulated (in large part we expect) by the much-enhanced incentives for production achieved by 
the introduction of the household-responsibility system (as discussed above), whereby farmers 
became the residual claimants on farm output.
26 In the second period (the mid-1990s) the higher 
agricultural incomes appear to have come from a substantial reduction in implicit taxation of the 
sector. From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, the government has operated a domestic food 
grain procurement policy by which farmers are obliged to sell fixed quotas to the government at 
prices that are typically below the local market price (but were left free to sell the remainder at 
market prices). For some farmers this was an infra-marginal tax, given that they produce more 
food grains than their assigned quota, but for others it will affect production decisions at the 
margin; Ravallion and Chen (2006) provide evidence that the reduction in this implicit tax 
brought substantial income gains to the rural economy and especially to the poor. 
Helping the rural poor connect to markets 
Attenuating the rise in inequality and assuring more rapid poverty reduction will require 
raising incomes in the lagging rural areas of both countries and this will require improved access 
to markets. The question of how this should be done is often framed as a choice between 
investing in poor-area development (jobs to people) or facilitating out-migration (people to jobs). 
Posing the choice this way almost certainly over-simplifies the problem. Migration to urban 
areas is likely to be pro-poor in both countries. However, out-migration will often not be feasible 
for poor rural households without the right sort of investments in poor areas, both in human 
resource development and agriculture. Conversely, while there may be scope for further 
                                                 
26   The literature has pointed to the importance of the reform to this system in stimulating rural economic 
growth at the early stages of China’s transition (Fan, 1991; Lin, 1992).    25
increases in agricultural incomes (e.g., through diversification into higher value crops) or for 
promoting rural non-farm employment, the share of agriculture in GDP is bound to decline in 
both countries, and geography and remoteness limit the possibilities of non-agricultural 
economic activity in poorer regions. 
We instead frame the question in terms of identifying and correcting the underlying 
market and governmental failures and redressing the asset inequalities that lock the poor out of 
profitable opportunities for self-advancement. From this perspective, in both countries, there are 
three priorities.  
First, rural infrastructure should have a high priority. China started its reform period with 
very poor rural infrastructure. Fiscal and borrowing constraints meant that it was some 10 years 
before it was feasible to embark on a massive expansion of infrastructure, such as the roads 
program that started around 1990. The differences in rural infrastructure across counties have 
strong explanatory power for subsequent consumption growth at the farm-household level in 
rural China (Jalan and Ravallion, 2002). Quite reasonable rates of return are possible from well-
designed programs for developing infrastructure in poor rural areas (Ravallion and Chen, 2005b). 
In India, the poor quality of rural infrastructure is widely acknowledged as an 
impediment to growth and poverty reduction. It is believed that there are high returns in terms of 
achieving more equitable growth from better rural finance and infrastructure in India, although 
this is not simply a matter of building facilities but raises deeper issues about the need for 
reforming existing institutional arrangements and provider incentives (World Bank, 2006). 
Second, better policies are needed for delivering quality health and education services to 
poor people. And third, policies are needed that allow key product and factor markets (for land, 
labor and credit) to work better from the point of view of poor people. In India this includes 
further deregulation of formal-sector labor markets. In the case of China, reducing the policy 
impediments to migration, and legal reforms to allow a market in land-use rights in rural China, 
giving farmers titles over land-use rights that they can sell, mortgage or pass onto their children, 
are priorities. China has resisted embarking on agricultural land market reform. Neighboring 
Vietnam did take this step in the 1990s, and the available evidence suggests that, on balance, this 
reform has helped in reducing poverty (Ravallion and van de Walle, 2006). 
Public spending and fiscal policy will play an important role in realizing these priorities. 
But much depends on fiscal resource mobilization and exactly how that spending is done. 
Removing biases against the poor in taxation and spending policies will be essential. As we have 
noted, reducing the government’s implicit taxation of farmers through food grain procurement 
quotas has been a powerful instrument against poverty in China. From this point of view, 
China’s recent policy to give tax breaks to farmers in poor regions is surely welcome, although 
without alternative revenue sources in poor areas one can expect either a decline in the local 
public investments and services needed for poverty reduction, or further poorly-compensated 
expropriations of farm-land by local authorities aiming to profit by selling the land to non-farm 
activities.    26
A second continuing issue in both countries is how to enhance local-level fiscal resources 
in poor areas. The priority both countries now give to the decentralization of social spending will 
have limited impacts on poverty and human development outcomes unless it comes with central 
efforts to assure greater fiscal redistribution to poor regions from better-off—and increasingly 
better-off—regions.   
Recent initiatives 
Policy makers and political leaders in both countries are clearly trying to find ways to 
help the rural poor connect to the process of growth. In China, the reduction and progressive 
elimination of agricultural taxes and fees and the limited introduction of subsidies for primary 
education in poor counties during the latter half of the 10th Five-Year Plan were early 
indications of a significant shift in the government’s priorities towards a greater emphasis on 
improving welfare in the countryside.
27 A key component of the plan is a package of measures 
aimed at what the leadership has termed, “building a new socialist countryside”.
28 The package 
calls for a systemic elimination of all agricultural taxes. But the elimination of agricultural taxes 
and fees raises new concerns. As we have noted, for many rural local governments, particularly 
in interior provinces and in poorer areas, these taxes and fees have been the main source of 
revenues from which to finance local public services, notably health and education. Not only 
does this potentially jeopardize access to and the quality of health and education services, given 
the huge disparities in the revenue bases of local governments, there are also implications for 
consumption poverty. China has been relatively unique in the high savings rates found among 
the poor. While a complete and detailed analysis of this question is yet to be done, common 
sense and conventional wisdom suggest that (apart from any intrinsic cultural proclivities for 
thrift) precautionary saving for uninsured health (and other) shocks, savings to finance 
educational costs, and life-cycle savings to fund old-age living expenses all play an important 
role in explaining why China’s poor save so much. 
The government appears to be well-aware of this concern, and a large part of the 
increased spending under the “building a new socialist countryside “ initiative is to be directed 
towards education and health services in the countryside. Among the initiatives mentioned are 
plans to provide several billion Yuan in supplementary funding for tens of millions of poor 
primary and junior middle school students and to offer free nine-year compulsory education to 
rural students. The central government also plans to double its subsidies for farmers if they join a 
state-backed medical cooperative fund designed to reduce the financial burdens of farmers. Other 
elements of the plan include increased subsidy payments for farmers and further government 
investment in rural public works. 
                                                 
27   First announced at the meeting of the Central Party Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 
2005, the reorientation in policy has been written in to the 11th Five Year Plan formally adopted by the National 
People’s Congress in its 2006 annual session. 
28   According to the budget tabled at the National Peoples Congress, the Chinese government plans to spend 
340 billion Yuan (US$42 billion) in agriculture, rural areas and farmers in 2006, which is 14 percent more than the 
previous year, and represents 22 percent of the increase in government spending from last year.   27
The “Minimum Livelihood Guarantee Scheme,” popularly known as Dibao has been the 
Government of China’s main response to the new challenges of social protection in the more 
market-based economy. This aims to guarantee a minimum income in urban areas, by filling the 
gap between actual income and a “Dibao line” set locally. While in theory this would eliminate 
Dibao poverty, the practice appears to fall well short of that goal due largely to imperfect 
coverage of the target group (Chen et al., 2006). Reforming the program and expanding 
coverage—including to (risk-prone) rural areas—pose a number of challenges. 
If indeed these plans are implemented effectively and targeted to poorer areas and poorer 
households in rural China, the prospects for poverty reduction, especially reduction in the 
number of consumption poor, during the 11th Five-Year Plan look promising. 
There have also been a number of new initiatives in India. The Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act of 2005 guarantees 100 days of work a year at the minimum agricultural wage 
rate to at least one member of every family. This is expected to have a large impact of rural 
poverty, although it is far from obvious that the scheme is the most cost-effective option for this 
purpose, once one considers all of the costs involved, including the forgone incomes of program 
participants (Murgai and Ravallion, 2005).  
The Government of India’s 2006-2007 budget also calls for substantially increased 
spending on rural infrastructure, job creation, health and education. New programs include 
Bharat Nirman (Building India) project to provide electricity, all-weather road connectivity and 
safe drinking water to all of India’s villages and Sarva Siksha Abhiyan, which aims to assure a 
minimum standard of elementary education. These programs are not explicitly targeted to poor 
areas, but in all likelihood that will be the outcome given that villages lacking these services and 
facilities will tend to be poor. 
5.  Conclusions 
Aggregate economic growth is rarely balanced across regions or sectors of a developing 
economy, and neither China nor India is an exception. We have seen that the post-reform pattern 
of growth has not been particularly pro-poor in either country. In China, growth in the primary 
sector (primarily agriculture) did more to reduce poverty and inequality than growth in either the 
secondary or tertiary sectors. In India, with higher initial inequality in access to land than China, 
agricultural growth was less important than tertiary sector growth. In both countries, there has 
been a marked geographic unevenness in the growth process, with numerous lagging regions, 
including some of those that started off among the poorest. 
Income inequality is rising, although India has not yet experienced the same trend 
increase in inequality that China has seen. Poverty in both countries is not becoming any more 
responsive to aggregate economic growth and is becoming more responsive to rising inequality. 
India’s poor did not start the reform period with the same advantages as China’s poor, in terms of 
access to land and education. Persistent inequalities in human resource development and access 
to essential infrastructure within both countries, but probably more so in India, are clearly   28
impeding the prospects for poor people to share in the aggregate economic gains spurred by 
reforms. The geographic dimensions of their inequalities and the associated disparities in fiscal 
resources and governmental capabilities loom large as policy concerns for the future in both 
countries. 
In the future, it will be harder for either country to maintain its past rate of progress 
against poverty without addressing the problem of high and rising inequality. However, it is not 
particularly useful to talk about “inequality” as a homogeneous entity in this context. Policy 
needs to focus on the specific dimensions of inequality that create or preserve unequal 
opportunities for participating in the gains from future economic growth. Arguably both 
countries are seeing a rise in these bad inequalities over time as the good inequalities (conducive 
to efficient growth) turn into bad ones, and the bad inequalities drive out the good ones. 
While both countries need to be concerned about the “bad inequalities” we have pointed 
to, we suspect that it is China where the near-term risk that rising inequality will jeopardize 
growth is greater. Arguably, the Chinese authorities have been able to compensate for rising 
inequality by achieving high growth rates; by this view, it is the rising inequality that fuels 
growth in China, through the political economy of maintaining “social stability.” The “catch 22” 
is that the emerging bad inequalities in China will make it harder to promote the growth that will 
be needed to compensate for those inequalities. Maintaining sufficient growth will require even 
greater efficacy of the policy levers used to promote growth. 
Whether or not the problem of rising inequality is successfully addressed, there are likely 
to be implications for the rest of the world. If the problem is not addressed, then there is a risk 
that the high growth rates will not be maintained, with spillover effects for trade and growth 
elsewhere. If it is addressed, and depending on exactly how this is done, there may be some 
short-term costs to growth, although (as we have argued) redressing the bad inequalities would 
actually be good for growth. There may also be consequences for the pattern of trade, such as 
through a change in the sectoral composition of growth; for example, in both countries there 
appears to be potential for cash crop expansion, which would attenuate one important source of 
concern about rising inequality, and it can be expected that a non-negligible share of this 
expansion in domestic cash-crop output would be exported. 
The new initiatives underway in both countries are probably steps in the right direction, 
although continuous evaluative research will be needed on the efficacy of these approaches 
relative to alternatives. There are important but poorly resolved issues concerning the appropriate 
balance between types of interventions. But an even harder challenge remains, namely to 
improve governance—capacity, accountability and responsiveness—notably (but not only) at the 
local level. If this challenge is left unmet, the ultimate efficacy of any of these initiatives will be 
in doubt.   29
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